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The origin of the trust concept was for a long time in doubt. The earlier
authorities traced it to the old Roman "Fidei Commissum." Modem scholarship, however, contends its source is traceable to Germanic law. Mr. Justice
Holmes in his notable monograph, "Early EnglislA Equity" indicates that the
trust is derived from the Germanic Salman or Treuhand. The trust which was
finally evolved from this was the result of the English juridical system with its
separation of courts of equity and courts of law: Scott on Trusts, sec. 1. 9.
The trust mechanism, more often than not, has served useful and legitimate
purposes. Its objectives could best be achieved through a maximum flexibility
in its provisions. The very qualities which induced its widespread use were employed at times to convert the trust into a device for the avoidance of obligations,
including taxation. The result has been that the trust status has been suspect
and throughout its history there have been recurring periods of legislative attempts to repress and restrict its use. A few instances will suffice to establish
the point. The Romans to whom some attribute the origin of the trust, in the
end prohibited the use of trusts altogether. In England through the Statute ot
Uses in 1535, restrictions were placed against trusts because they were used to
evade the rights of creditors and the feudal prerogatives of the King. Later, in
1585, the Statute of Elizabeth was enacted to further protect the rights of
creditors.
*Member, Philadelphia Bar; author, Estate Planning and Estate Tax Savings; lecturer, 1943-1944
Institute of Federal Taxation, New York University; special lecturer, Estate, Gift and Inheritance Taxes, Dickinson Law School; LLB Dickinson School of Law, 1922.
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The use of the trust device for income and estate tax avoidance long has
been resorted to by taxpayers. Under our system of income taxation, the trust
is recognized as a separate entity for the reporting of its income. Legal ingenuity
has developed infinite refinements to separate the trust estate from the grantor
and at the same time retain for him, or those who are the natural objects of his
bounty, as many of the attributes of ownership which the existing state of the
law permitted. Many of these succeeded in reducing the over-all liability for
income taxation of the family unit while it continued to enjoy the benefits of
the income which stemmed from the grantor. The trust status early became and
has remained an object of suspicion because of its facile adaptability for tax
avoidance. Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code as now written was inserted in 1934 to make taxable to the grantor the income of a trust where he
retained the right to recapture the corpus. Section 167 of the Code took its
present form in the Revenue Act of 1932 to prevent avoidance of surtax by the
trust device when the income really remained in substance at the disposal of the
settlor: Senate Report No. 665, 72nd Congress, 1st Sessions, p. 34-35.
The trust mechanism possesses a capacity for complexity and flexibility as
to powers and as to the beneficial interests which could be created through it.
Consequently, sections 166 and 167 have not been completely effective in producing a consistent result to prevent tax avoidance. The treasury department
through its regulations, and the Courts by their decisions, have endeavored to
supply the missing stop-gap. One method was by advancing the principle that
the Government is not required to tax trusts as separate taxable entities when
the terms of the trust instrument and the manner of conducting the trusts indicate that they are not entitled to be distinguished from the grantor for tax purposes: Estate of O'Laughlin, 38 BTA 1120, aff'd (as First National Bank of
Chicago v. Commissioner) 110 F (2d) 448 (CCA-7th, 1940). Another means
was by resort to the concept of gross taxable income under the provisions of
section 22 (a). Accordingly, even if a valid trust were created, it would be disregarded where the settlor, at his uncontrolled discretion, could have used the
trust property as absolute owner, though its income might be distributed to another: Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940).
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF TAXATION OF INCOME OF TRUSTS
It is interesting to examine through a review of the decisions the evolution
of the law of federal taxation of the income of trusts. We commence with the
cardinal test of the ownership of the income. The incidence of taxation of income was made to depend upon who owned the income. The Supreme Court, in
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930), forcefully reaffirmed this concept when
it held, in a case involving the income tax liability of husband and wife in community property states, that only half of the income could be taxed to the husband because he owned only half thereof.
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The next basis for taxation of income was determined by the answer to
the query-Who controlled the income? In the absence of control over the
income, a husband was held not taxable upon the income of his wife: Hoeper v.
Wisconsin, 284 U. S. 206 (1931).
Then followed the effort to tax the income to someone other than the person who owned or controlled the income upon the principle that such other in
reality enjoyed the income. The great dissenters in the Supreme Court, Justices
Holmes and Brandeis, labored to persuade the majority court in Hoeper v.
Wisconsin, supra, that despite the fact that the husband might not be able to
control his wife's income, its enjoyment nevertheless inured to his benefit because it assisted him in the payment of the expenses of the family. Their philosophy -was at that time still too advanced. Later, in Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.
S. 1 (1936), the Supreme Court adopted their theory and held the income of
the trust taxable to the person who enjoyed it. In that case, the income was used
for the satisfaction of the grantor's obligations.
It was at this point that the Supreme Court decided Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U. S. 331, (1940). This case advanced a new concept for the taxation of
trust income, namely, the ownership of the corpus or the property from which
the income was derived. Then followed Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154
(1942) which extended even farther this theory of the enjoyment of income
as the basis for taxation by holding that the income of a trust could be made
taxable to the grantor if there were a "possibility" of the enjoyment of the income
by him through the fact that the income might be used by him for the support,
maintenance or education of the grantor's legal dependents. This latter decision
was in effect reversed by legislative act of Congress through the provisions of
section 134 of the Revenue Act of 1943. The Clifford and Stuart cases and the
consequences of this section are discussed more fully in a subsequent portion of
this article.
In the presentation of this subject, emphasis will be placed upon the more
recent developments in the taxability of the income of family trusts.
THE CLIFFORD CASE AND ITS AFTERMATH

Until the Clifford case, the short term family trust was a favorite device.
Under it, the grantor irrevocably transferred his property to himself as trustee
for a- fixed term, usually not more than five to ten years, designated members of
his family as beneficiaries and provided that at the expiration of the term, the
corpus was to be returned to him. In the interim, the trust income was taxable
to the trust and not the grantor.
In the Clifford case, involving such an irrevocable trust for the term of five
years, Mr. Justice Douglas declared that where the grantor is the trustee and the

36
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beneficiaries are members of his family group, special scrutiny of the arrangement is necessary lest what is in reality but one economic unit be multiplied
into two or more by devices which, though valid under State law, are not conclusive so far as section 22 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code is concerned; that
each case must be determined by an analysis of the terms of the trust and all
the circumstances attendant on its creation and operation. The court also stated
that no one fact is decisive but all considerations are relevant to the question
of ownership and are appropriate foundations for findings on that issue. The
inquiry should be: Was the grantor still the owner of the fund? It is hard to
imagine, said the court, that the grantor felt himself poorer after the trust
had been executed. For, as a result of (1) the short term of the trust, (2) the
intimacy of the family relationship and (3) the retention of the substance of
full enjoyment of all the rights previously had by the grantor, he had not parted
with the property. That might not be true if only legal rights were considered.
But when the benefits flowing to him indirectly through his wife are added to
the legal rights he retained, the aggregate may be said to be a fair equivalent
of what he previously had. Accordingly, the court held the trust income taxable
to the grantor.
EXTENSIONS OF CLIFFORD DOCTRINE

It has not been unknown in our system of jurisprudence for the courts
to indulge in "judicial legislation." Whether this usurpation by the courts, of
the functions of the legislative branch of our government is due to a tardiness
on the part of the Congress to strike down patent devices to avoid the consequences of the statutes or whether it stems from the zealousness of the judiciary
to protect the interests of the Nation where legislative enactments fall short, is
a matter of no particular importance. The result is none the less, judicial legislation which a modern jurist described as "one of the facts of life, an inescapable
and necessary one."
The Clifford case was plainly such an instance. Mr. Justice Roberts in his
dissenting opinion in that case took the majority court to task for confusing its
judicial function with that of the legislative powers of Congress. The results of
such over-reaching by the courts are often painful and disconcerting. As indicated above, the Clifford case, restricted to its own facts, announced a salutary
principle. Under it, the mechanism of the family trust for a period of five years
or less at the ena of which the corpus was to be returned to the grantor, was no
longer to be available for income tax avoidance. Congress had failed and, in
fact, on two occasions had declined to enact legislation which had been 'introduced to prevent such devices. H. R. 1385, 73 Congress 2nd Sessions, p. 24 and
H. R. 7835 same session, p. 151.
As happens with judicial legislation, the principles announced by the
Clifford decision were thereafter relied upon as precedents by the courts of the
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nation. There followed in later decisions a stream of dramatic and illuminating phases such as "appraise trust instruments against a background of realities,"
"family solidarity," the family is the "economic unit," "the economic realities
of enjoyment and the realization of income through non-material satisfactions,"
"controls retained by settlors, not niceties of title," all intended to serve as torches,
lighting the way for advanced economic and taxation theories. The limited facts
of the original decision were disregarded. Courts proceeded to read into the
doctrine handed down implications and by their decisions promulgated extensions thereof. In most instances, the enlarging interpretations seemed to follow
with faithful logic and plausability the rationale of the basic principles.
We should like to trace the developments. The principle established by the
Clifford .case, which was intended to cover only short term family trusts, was
applied soon to a ten year trust created by the grantor for the benefit of his son:
Commissioner v. Berolzheimer, 116 F (2d) 628 (CCA-2nd, 1940). Later, the
same circuit in 1941 extended the Clifford rule to a trust whose term was six
years and sixteen days: Commissioner v. Barbour, 122 F (2d) 165, cert. den.
314 U. S. 691; another whose term was six and one-half years: Commissioner v.
Woolley, 122 F (2d) 167, cert. den. 314 U. S. 693; another where there was
a power to revoke after six and one-half years: Helvering v. Elias, 122 F (2d)
171, cert. den. 314 U. S. 692. Then the doctrine was extended to an irrevocable
long term trust: Stein v. Commission, 41 B. T. A. 994 (1940); Commissioner
v. Buck, 120 F (2d) 775 (CCA-2nd, 1941); Warren v. Commissioner, 45 B. T.
A. 379, affirmed 133 F (2d) 312 (CCA-6th, 1943). Nor did the absence of
any possibility of reverter of principal or income alter the incidence of tax:
Rentschler v. Commissioner, 1 TC 814 (1943).
The fact that the grantor was not the trustee did not prevent the courts from
making the income taxable to the grantor: Byerly v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op.
(CCH Dec. 13, 819 (M)) March 21, 1944.
In another case the grantor created funded insurance trusts naming herself
and a bank as trustees but retained control over the corpus. The income was to
be used to pay premiums on insurance policies on husband's life which were
assigned to the trust. She had broad powers of management. The income of the
trusts she created was held taxable to the grantor because of her control over
corpus: White v. Higgins, 116 F (2d) 312 (CCA-lst, 1941).
By this process of logical extensions, ultimate illogical and untenable results
were obtained. Then, the pendulum having swung too far, the recession set in
and a hurried retreat is now being made to the safer ground of sound logic and
sensible interpretations.
RESTRICTIONS OF CLIFFORD DOCTRINE

The courts soon recognized that unwarranted extensions of the Clifford
doctrine had resulted. Efforts were made to limit its application. Thus, the
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court refused to apply the Clifford rule where the original term of the trust
was for ten years but was subsequently extended: Commissioner v. Jonas, 122 F
(2d) 169 (CCA-2nd, 1941).
In another case, where the grantor's power to control the allocation of the
trust income would require him to so totally disregard the purposes of the trust
that judicial intervention would result, the income was held not taxable to the
grantor: Phipps "v.Commissioner, 137 F (2d) 141 (CCA-2nd, 1943).
Again, in an irrevocable trust for the exclusive benefit of the minor children
of the grantor-trustee, where the income was not to be distributed to the beneficiaries until they reached 21 years of age, such a provision was held not to
amount to a temporary reallocation of income within the intimate family group:
Meyers v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH. Dec. 13, 941 (M)) May 17,
1944. Nor was the result changed where distribution to the beneficiaries after
attaining the age of 21 was subject to the written order of the grantor: Whiteley
v. Commissioner, 2 TC 618 (1943).
In still another instance, a grantor made irrevocable gifts of interests in his
business to his wife individually and as trustee for their three minor children.
Thereafter, he entered into an agreement to carry on the business as a partnership of which he became the managing partner. The trustee was permitted to
use corpus or income for the children's maintenance. The Tax Court refused
to extend the Clifford case to cover a family partnership resulting from a valid
and bona fide gift by the grantor to members of his family even though some of
the partners were trustees for his minor children: Scherer v. Commissioner, 3 TC
776, May 10, 1944. To the same effect: Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v.Commissioner, TC Memo. Op. (CCH.Dec. 14,001 (M)) June 22, 1944.
TRUSTS FOR MAINTENANCE

AND

SUPPORT OF DEPENDENTS

In Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935), the grantor was held taxable
on the income of a trust created for the maintenance and support of a beneficiary
whom he was under legal obligation to support. Following this decision, the
Treasury Department by G. C. M. 18972, C. B. 1937-2, page 231, announced
the rule, for reasons of 'administrative convenience, that in cases of discretionary trusts, the income should be taxable to the grantor only to' fhe extent that it
was actually applied to the discharge of his obligation of maintenance and support. So stood the law and Treasury Department practice until Helvering v. Stuart,
317 U. S. 154 (1942), burst upon the scene.
In this case, Stuart created four trusts, one for each of his minor children,
naming his wife, his brother and himself as trustees. The trust corpus consisted
of shares of stock in the Quaker Oats Company of which the grantor was first
vice-president and his brother, the co-trustee, was president. The trustees were
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given the power and authority of "absolute owners" over the handling of the
financial details of the respective trusts including the recapture of the stock upon
payment of its value and were not to be responsible for their acts except for actual
fraud and wilful mismanagement.
The trustees in their discretion were directed to pay over to the respective
beneficiaries all or part of the net income of the trust fund or to apply the same
to their education, support and maintenance. The undistributed balance of income
was to be added to the trust corpus which was to be distributed to the beneficiaries,
one half at the age 25 years and the other at age 30. The court held that the
"possibility" of the use of the trust income to relieve the grantor pro tanto of
his
parental obligation of support was sufficient to render the income of the trust
taxable to him.
RETROACTmTY LIMITED BY TREASURY

The Treasury Department was not particularly delighted with this victory.
In fact, it was embarrassed by the administrative difficulties which the application
of the principle would create. It necessitated a practice directly at variance with
that which prevailed under G. C. M. 18972, in force since 1937. To recompute
the income on all such discretionary trusts for all open years would invite chaos.
Therefore, it promptly yielded up its advantage under the Stuart decision as to
back years by issuing I. T. 3609 (I.R.B. 1943-10-11437) by which it prior practice
was restored. Certain conditions being compiled with, only such part of the trust
income which was actually applied to the maintenance and support of the minor
before December 31, 1942 would be held taNable to the grantor.
There were several qualifications under this ruling. One was that the principles of the Stuart case were to be observed wherever it was necessary to protect the interests of the Government; another, that the ruling was not to apply
in any case, (a) where the grantor of the trust may be required to include the
income thereof in his gross income under the rule of Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U. S. 331 (1940); or (b) where the use of the income to satisfy obligations of
the grantor is not discretionary but is mandatory.
REVENUE

AcT

OF

1943

Section 134 (a) of the 1943 Revenue Act added subsection (c) to section
167 of the Internal Revenue Code. It now provides that income of a discretionary trust for the maintenance and support of a beneficiary, whom the grantor is
under legal obligation to maintain, shall not be taxable to the grantor merely
because such income in the discretion of another person, the trustee, or the grantor
acting as trustee or co-trustee, may be applied or distributed for the support
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or maintenance of such beneficiary, except to the extent that the income is actually so applied. It further provides that where the amounts so used are paid
out of corpus or out of other than income., they are to be considered as paid out
of income only to the extent of income of the trust for such taxable year which
is not paid, credited or distributed under section 162 and which is not otherwise
taxable to the grantor.
The effect of the amendment made by Section 134 of the 1943 Revenue
Act is to reinstate the rule which prevailed before the Stuart case, and thus,
with the approval of the Treasury Department, to cancel that decision.
The grantor of a trust continues to be taxable under section 167 in the following circumstances:
(1) With respect to such income as may be, in the discretion of persons
lacking a substantial adverse interest, applied in discharge of his obligations
other than his obligation of support or maintenance falling within section 167
(c). Thus, if the grantor creates a trust, the income of which may, in the discretion of a person lacking a substantial adverse interest, be applied in the payment of the grantor's debts, including the payment of his rent or other household expenses, such income is taxable to the grantor regardless of whether it is
actually so applied.
(2) If discretion to apply or distribute the trust income rests solely in
the grantor or in the grantor in conjunction with other persons unless the grantor
has such discretion as trustee: Sen. Rep. No. 627, 78th Congress, 1st Session
(1943) 56.
(3) Where, under the terms of the trust, income is required to be applied
to the support or maintenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally obligated
to support.
Section 167 (c) does not affect the present scope of sections 22 (k) and
171 (relating to alimony and separate maintenance payments taxable to a wife
or former wife). Nor does section 167 (c) alter the provsiions governing the
taxability of trust income to the grantor under some other provision of law, as
for example, section 22 (a): Regulation 111-sec. 29.167-1. See also: The
Federal Income Tax and Trusts for Support-The Stuart Case and Its Aftermath
by Guterman-57 Harvard L. R. 479 (1944).
The provisions of section 134 were applied in: Cartinhour v. Commissioner,
3 TC 482 (March 20, 1944); Wachovia Bank v. Commissioner, TC memo. op.
(CCH. Dec. 14001 (M)) June 22, 1944; Whiteley v. Commissioner, 3 TC-No.
161 (August 23, 1944); Gregg Jr. v. Commissioner, TC memo. op. (CCH. Dec.
14126 (M)) September 14, 1944.
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EFFECT OF GRANTOR'S RETAINED POWERS OF MANAGEMENT
AND INVESTMENT

The power to manage trust property, however unlimited, may not operate
to bring the grantor within the provisions of section 22 (a) and make the trust
income taxable to him if by such power he cannot derive any economic benefit
therefrom except whatever advantages he may gain by virtue of the statutory
provisions which permit the creation of trusts or estates. The control over the
income exercised by the grantor must be very substantial if the income is to be
considered his. The fact that the trustee may be changed by the grantor, or that
a co-trustee may not be regarded as independent, is not necessarily controlling.
The trend of decisions is to permit the grantor to retain broad powers of management and control so long as he cannot benefit personally. The courts have
said repeatedly that broad powers of management in trustees, even though without adverse interest, point to complete divestment of control. This rule has
salutary social and economic implications. There would seem to be no valid
reasons for taxing the income of such trusts to the grantor who has parted with
all the incidents and benefits of ownership of the property simply because he retains
the normal interest of a parent or benefactor in seeking to manage the trust property for the best interests of the beneficiary.
Thus, in Commissioner v. Branch, 114 F (2d) 985, (CCA-lst, 1940),
grantor created a trust naming himself and two others as trustees to pay income
to his wife for life. Upon her death, the trust was to revert to the grantor if he
survived her and, otherwise, was to go as she might appoint, or in default, to
grantor's descendants. His wife alone had power to revoke. As long as the
grantor was trustee, he had the power to exercise broad powers of management.
The first Circuit Court of Appeals held that where the grantor had stripped himself of all command over the income for an indefinite period and in all probability, under the terms of the trust instrument, would never regain beneficial ownership of the corpus, there appeared to be no statutory basis for treating the income
as that of the grantor under section 22 (a) merely because he made himself
trustee with broad powers in that capacity to manage the trust estate.
Similarly, where the trust was for the benefit of the grantor's wife, their
children and their issue, and the grantor-trustee retained broad powers of management, the income was held not taxable to grantor despite the fact that the
stock whose title had been conveyed to the trust was undelivered and remained
pledged as collateral for the grantor's loans and the grantor retained the right
to purchase certain stock from the trust at a fair price: Helvering vs. Palmer, 115
F (2d) 368 (CCA-2nd, 1940).
In another case, the income of a trust was held not taxable to the grantor
who created certain 20 year trusts for his children, the income therefrom to be
accumulated. Though not named as trustee, the grantor reserved the right to
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make such changes in the management of the trust as the best interests of the
beneficiaries required. It amounted to full power of control and management of
the trust estate, the same as if he were designated the trustee. The power to
revoke or retake any of the corpus or income was specifically denied to him.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the power of management, however
unlimited, may not operate to bring the grantor within the sweeping provisions
of section 22 (a) if by such powers he cannot derive any economic benefit therefrom, except whatever advantages he may gain by virtue of the provisions of the
Revenue Act which permits the creation of trusts -and imposes taxation under
section 161 et seq. The grantor retained neither the power to revoke, revest or
revert either corpus or income. In the absence of these essential elements, there
can be no substantial incidents or attributes of ownership sufficient to vest in the
grantor any of the economic benefits necessary to taxation under section 22 (a)
or sections 166 or 167: Jones v. Norris, 122 F (2d) 6 (CCA-10th, 1941).
Again, the grantor executed a trust in which she declared that she -held
certain securities deposited with her as trustee with power to manage and control
and to invest the same with the same discretion as, if she were the owner. All
income and such part of the principal as should be necessary were to be paid
to her married daughter for her lifetime, for her support and maintenance.
Upon the death of her daughter the remainder of the trust was to be delivered
to the grantor if living and if not, to her estate. The daughter had no right to
assign, transfer or encumber the trust or any of its income. The trustee could
resign at any time and in that event a bank was to succeed her. She did resign
in December 1935 and was succeeded by a bank. She then executed another
trust agreement including therein a surrender of her reversion.
Upon these facts the seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the mother
created the trust not in pursuance of any legal obligation, (daughter was married) promise or contract but solely as a gratuitous, voluntary act, in satisfaction
of a desire to assure the daughter an adequate income and to make partial reparation to her for her sacrifice in helping her father. During latter's lifetime she
had given him substantial personal property in an effort to aid him when he
became financially distressed. The income of trust was held not taxable to
grantor: Co'mmisioner v. Armour, 125 F (2d) 467 (GCA-7th, 1942).
Likewise, the grantor created an irrevocable trust of indeterminate term for
his wife and her minor sons of a former marriage. A bank was named trustee.
The grantor retained broad powers of control over the trust and the corpus was
to revert to the grantor only if he survived his wife. The sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held the income of the trust not taxable to the grantor: Suhr v. Commissioner, 126 F (2d) 283 (CCA-6th, 1942).
In another case, the grantor set up three trusts, the income to be distributed
to his three children. He was named trustee, had full power of management over
the trusts, and with others (his wife and children) could revoke them. The
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grantor was not entitled to and did not receive any of the corpus or income ot
the trusts, and under the trust instrument, was pledged to support his children
out of his separate estate. On the finding as to each trust that a power of revocation was vested in the grantor jointly with others, each of whom has a substantial adverse interest in-the corpus as well as the income of the trust, and that
grantor, under Illinois law, was without power or authority to use the trust
income to relieve himself of his parental obligation, the seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the income of the trusts was not taxable to him: Commissioner v. Katz, 139 F (2d) 108 (CCA-7th, 1943).
RECENT TAX COURT DECISIONS

Where the grantor retained the right to control the sale of the shares of
stock in trust, was president of the company whose shares were owned by the
trust and was fully cognizant of its affairs, the Tax Court held the management
provision not to be unnatural, nor did it indicate such a retention of control over
the trust as to make the grantor taxable on the income therefrom: Stuart v. Commissioner, 2 TC 1103 (1943).
Likewise, a husband and wife joined in the creation of a trust for their
children, the husband contributing non-income producing insurance policies upon
his life and the wife, income producing properties. The income, though not
specifically required by the terms of the trust to be so used, was applied to the
payment of premiums upon the policies. The husband was in effect the sole
trustee but he had no right to take either the corpus or income for himself. The
Tax Court held: (1) an unlimited power to manage trust property did not
make the grantor taxable under Code Sec. 22 (a) on the income from the trust
where he gains no economic benefit therefrom. (2) The husband was not taxable under code Sec. 167 since he was not the grantor of the property which
produced the income: Cartinhour v. Commissioner, 3 TC 482 (March 20,
1944).
On the other hand, the grantor of an irrevocable trust for his spouse and
children named himself one of the trustees. He retained for his lifetime wide
powers of management. No part of corpus could be revested in him and none
of the income could be distributed to him or held for future distribution to him.
The Tax Court held that broad powers of management in trustees, even though
without adverse interest, point to complete divestment of control. The income
of trust was not taxable to the grantor: Cherry v. Commissioner, 3 TC-No. 149
(July 31, 1944). To the same effect: Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940);
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
In another case, a grantor executed an agreement of trust and transferred
to himself as trustee certain stock. The net income was payable in equal shares
to the surviving children and their issue of grantor and his wife. Upon termina-
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tion of the trust, which was to endure during the lives of grantor's two daughters, the corpus was to be divided among the children. The question was
whether the controls retained by petitioner over the trust including the possible
benefit available through the discretionary use of income for the maintenance
of his dependents, were such as to make the trust income his own under section
22 (a) and the principle of Helvering v. Clifford. The Tax Court held the
trust income not taxable to grantor: Small v. Commissioner, 3 TC No. 145
(July 21, 1944).
Similarly, where the grantor-trustee created irrevocable trusts for his minor
children whose income was to be accumulated during minority but could be used
for them if he were financially unable to maintain them. Broad powers of management were retained. The trust funds were temporarily invested in the stock
of a corporation in which grantor's wife owned a controlling interest. The income of trust was not taxable to grantor: Cullen v. Commissioner, TC Memo.
op. (CCH. Dec...14,039 (M)) July 15, 1944.
Again, a husband and wife created reciprocal trusts for the benefit of the
other and their children. Each, as settlor and trustee, had broad powers of management, but could not revest the corpus in himself or herself, receive the income personally, use it to discharge personal obligations, or accumulate it for
future distribution to the grantors. The income of trusts was held not taxable
to grantors: Cassatt v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH. Dec. 14,075
(M)) July 31, 1944.
Finally, where the broad administrative powers over corpus are coupled
with powers retained by the settlor to pay or withhold income from the named
beneficiaries, a sufficient economic advantage was held to have been retained
by the grantor to justify taxing the income of the trust to him: George v. Commissioner, 143 F (2d) 873 (CCA-8th, July 17, 1944).
EFFECT OF POWER RETAINED BY GRANTOR-TRUSTEE TO CONTROL DISTRIBUTION
OF INCOMX OR PRINCIPAL OR TO SHIFT BENEFICIAL INTERESTS
The incidence of taxation of trust income to the grantor depends heavily
upon the power retained by him to control the distribution of the benefits of the
trust. The term of the trust, whether long or short, is not determinative. The
rationale of the grantor's liability for tax on the trust income under these circumstances is realistic and is predicated upon his continued enjoyment of ownership rights.
The grantor's control may exist through his power to accumulate or distribute the income, to withhold, postpone or pay out the corpus of the trust
estate or to change the beneficiaries or to alter their distributive shares. It is of
no importance that such shifts of beneficiaries, by the provisions of the trust
instrument, may not inure to the benefit of the grantor.
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The control factor is sufficiently present when the trust is of short duration because the grantor will soon reacquire complete dominion, even if there
are no express reservations of control; while, if the trust is of long duration,
the donor is to be regarded as the owner, if he expressly reserved a very substantial measure of control over the disposition of the income: Commissioner

v. Buck, 120 F (2d) 775 (1941); Helvering v. Elias, 122 F (2d) 171 (1941);
Paul, Revocable Trusts and the Income Tax, in Studies in Federal Taxation
(Third Series, 1940) at 224-225.
Where the grantor was co-trustee with his wife of a trust whose income
was payable to her life and over which he retained the right to alter, provided
the income could not be paid to him, the income was held taxable to the grantor:
Stein v. Commissoner, 41 B.T.A. 994 (1940).
In another case, the income of a trust was held taxable to the grantor where
he retained right to change both the beneficiaries and the proportion of income
payable to any beneficiary except that such changes could not be for the benefit
or use of grantor: Brown v. Commissioner, 131 F (2d) 640 (1942), cert. den.
318 U. S. 767 (1943).
So, too, the right retained by grantor-trustee of a trust for the benefit of
his only child to designate another beneficiary rendered the income taxable to
grantor: Hyman v. Commissioner, 143 F (2d) 425 (CCA-2nd, June 30, 1944).
Similarly, the grantor was held taxable on trust income where he was sole
trustee with power to shift beneficial interests and with power to make unlimited
advances to beneficiaries: Foerderer v. Commissioner, 141 F (2d) 53 (CCA-3ra,
January 31, 1944).
Again, the grantor created three trusts for minor sons and named himself
trustee with broad powers. He retained, alone, power to accumulate or to distribute trust income or corpus and could extend the trust for balance of his lifetime. The Tax Court held the income taxable to grantor: Miller v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH 13,814 (M) March 18, 1944. To same effect:
Harper v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH Dec. 13,766 (M)) February
24, 1944.
In another case, the grantor created ten irrevocable trusts naming himself
trustee with broad administrative powers. The beneficiaries were his children
and grandchildren, In children's trusts, he retained the right to distribute income to them in amounts deemed proper. In grandchildren's trust, he retained
right to pay income or accumulate it. The Tax Court held the income of trusts
taxable to grantor: Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 3 TC 255 (February 14, 1944).
Even in a long term family trust where broad administrative powers are
coupled with power retained by settlor to pay or withhold the income of the
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trust from the named beneficiaries, a sufficient economic advantage is retained
by the grantor to justify taxing the income of the trust to him: Hooks v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH. Dec. 14,111 (M)) August 22, 1944.
So, too, where the grantor, sole trustee for his minor daughter and adult
son, retained unlimited power to accumulate or pay income, had power to invade
corpus in his discretion and to vote stock in a corporation of which he was
president, director and large stockholder, the trust income was held taxable
to him: Edison v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH Dec. 13,974 (M) June
6, 1944.

The power retained by grantor of a 20 year trust to pay to or withhold
from the named beneficiaries the income of the trust together with broad administrative powers in the grantor constituted a sufficient economic advantage
retained by him to make the income of the trust taxable to the grantor: George
v. Commissioner, 143 F (2d) 837 (CCA-8th, July 17, 1944).
POWER RETAINED BY GRANTOR TO APPOINT OR RECEIVE CORPUS

The retention by the grantor of the right to receive the corpus of a trust or
to appoint the beneficiary who will enjoy the same has been held sufficient
to render the income of the trust taxable to the grantor.
So, the income of a trust was held taxable to the grantor who created funded
life insurance trusts naming herself and a bank trustees. She had broad powers
of management and retained the right, prior to husband's death, to surrender
the policies on his life for cash and receive same. The income or corpus after
his death was payable to her, at her discretion: White v. Higgins, 116 F (2d)
312 (CCA-lst, 1940).
On the other hand, a grantor created a trust for his life naming his wife
as trustee. Upon termination, the corpus was to be paid to persons appointed
by his deed or will. In default of exercise of power, it was to go to the grantors
three children. From the income accruing, the wife-trustee took whatever she
wanted, gave some to her husband and accumulated the balance. The Tax
Court held the income of the trust not taxable to grantor-husband: Funk v.
Commissioner TC Memo. op. (CCH. Dec. 13,727 (M)) February 7, 1944.
However, retention of trust property by the grantor, as guardian during
minority of beneficiaries, with power of investment, did not make the income
taxable to the grantor: Abraham v Commissioner, 3 TC-No. 122 (June 8, 1944).
GRANTOR'S POWER TO REVEST CORPUS FOR A CONSIDERATION

Where the right of the grantor-trustee to revest the corpus in himself is
predicated upon the payment of a fair consideration, or is subject to conditions
over which he does not have control, the trust income will not be held taxable to
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him. However, where the price to be paid for recapture of the trust property
by him is to be determined solely by the grantor, the incidence of tax is otherwise.
Where the grantor-trustee with broad powers
the benefit of his wife and their issue retained
stock from the trust at a fair price, the income of
to the grantor: Helvering v.Palmer, 115 F (2d)

of management of a trust for
the right to purchase certain
the trust was held not taxable
368 (1940).

Similarly, where the grantor-trustee's right to revest the corpus (stock in a
corporation) in himself is based upon the payment of a consideration and the
consent of his fellow directors and stockholders under the terms of a restrictive
agreement and there is no evidence that this assent could be obtained, it was
held that the grantor was not taxable on income of the trust: Moore v. Commissioner, 3 TC-No. 154, August 7, 1944.

A similar power to recapture the trust shares of stock retained, by the trustees for a fair price was commented upon in passing but was not significantly
regarded: Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S.154 (1943).
On the other hand, where the grantor's right to buy and sell to the trusts
was at prices to be determined by himself, the power was construed to be equal
to a power of revocation and the income was taxable to the grantor:Warren v.
Commissioner, 45 B. T. A. 379, affirmed 133 F (2d) 312 (CCA-6th, 1943);
Heyman v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1009 (1941).
EFFECT OF GRANTOR'S POWER TO REVEST

Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the taxation of the
income of a trust to the grantor where at any time during the taxable year the
power to revest in the grantor any part of the corpus of the trust is vested in the
grantor, or in any person not having a substantial adverse interest, or in the two
together. This section was held not to apply to a mere reversion in favor of
the grantor where the power to revest in the grantor was not retained by him:
Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S.344 (1940).
That there is no right of reversion will not preclude the taxation of the
income to the grantor where he has retained other rights and powers of such
magnitude as to justify that result: Marshall v,Commissioner, 1 TC 442 (1943);
Warren v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 379, affirmed 133 F (2d) 312 (1943);
and this is so, even where the trust is for a long term and there is no possibility
of reversion after the death of the primary beneficiary: Frederick B. Rentschler
v. Commissioner, 1 TC 814 (1943).
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UsE OF TRUST FUND IN GRANTOR-TRUSTEE'S BUSINESS VENTURES

Where the grantor-trustee retains broad powers of management, the use
of the trust funds as loans tending to promote the grantor's business venture
will not, of itself, render the trust income-taxable to him if the investments are
safe and profitable transactions for the trust. Likewise, where the trust property
represents a capital interest in a co-partnership which was the gift to the trust by
the grantor who owns the controlling interest in the partnership, his continuing
control and management of the co-partnership affairs will not cause the income
to be taxable to him. In a recent Circuit Court of Appeals case, the fact that
the trust gave the grantor no greater voice in the management of the partnership
after the trust was created than before, was regarded as an important factor.
Thus, the grantors were engaged in business as equal partners which they
dissolved. Immediately, they entered into a new agreement of limited partnership, the parties to which were the grantors as general partners and their respective wives in their own right and as trustees for their respective children, as
limited partners. The grantors, as general partners, retained exclusive control
of the business. The Tax Court held that the income of the trusts was not taxable to the grantors: Nathan et al v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH.
Dec. 13,192 (M)) 1943. To the same effect: Wachovia Bank and Trust Co.
v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH. Dec. 14,001 (M)) June 22, 1944.
In another case the grantor and his wife created two irrevocable trusts without reversion for their minor children. The funds of the trusts were employed
largely in loans that tended to promote the enterprises of the grantors. The loans
were safe and profitable transactions for the trust. The income was held not
taxable to grantors under 22 (a) as applied in Helvering v. Clifford: Greenspun
v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH. Dec. 13,876 (M)) April 22, 1944.
Likewise, a grantor make irrevocable gifts of interests in his business to his
wife individually and as trustee for three minor children. Thereafter, he entered
into an agreement with his wife individually and as trustee for the children to
conduct the business as a partnership. The trustee was permitted to pay either
corpus or income for the support, maintenance and education of the family. The
grantor was the managing partner. The Tax Court held that the income of the
trust for the children not taxable to grantor and the trusts were valid and bona
fide partners: Scherer v. Commissioner, 3 TC 776 (May 10, 1.944).
Similarly, a grantor set up an irrevocable short term trust for his two minor
children with absolute power of management. The trust estate consisted of a
five per cent interest in a family partnership in which the grantor already owned
a 55 % interest. The trust share gave the grantor no greater voice in its management than he had without it. The income of trust was not taxable to grantor:
Armstrong v. Commissioner, 143 F (2d) 700 (CCA-10th, July 6, 1944), reversing 1 TC 1008.
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On the other hand, in still another case the grantors, husband and wife,
created trust for minor sons of an interest in an existing family partnership. The
husband was named as trustee with entire management and control of the partnership business and of the trust property for the use of the grantors'-sons. The
term of the trust was to terminate when the sons reachi 25 years of age but could
be extended by the trustee. The Tax Court held the income of trust taxable to
grantors under the principles of the Clifford case. It cqncluded that there was only a
temporary reallocation of income within the family group and the wife could
not have felt herself poorer after the creation of the trust: Losh v. Commissioner,
1 TC 1019 (1943), affirmed CCA-10th, November 3, 1944.

Where the business interest transferred by the father to the trust for his
minor children was in a personal service business whose earnings were due mainly
to the personal efforts of the taxpayer and capital was no income producing
factor, the income of the business and the trust will be held entirely taxable
to the grantor: Schroder v. Commissioner, 134 F (2d) 346 (1943); Earp v. Jones,
131 F (2d) 292, cert. den. 63 S. Ct. 665, (1943); Wlaldburger v. Commissioner,
131 F (2d) 598 (1942); Tinkoff v.Commissioner, 120 F (2d) 564 (1941);
Argo v. Commissioner, 3 TC-No. 143, July 20, 1944; Whittenberg v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH. Dec. 14,125 (M)) September 13, 1944.
TRUST STOCK IN A CORPORATION WHICH GRANTOR CONTROLS OR HAS
SUBSTANTIAL

INTEREST IN

The mere fact that the securities which the grantor transferred to the trust
of which he named himself trustee was stock in a corporation which he controls
or in which he has a substantial interest does not, of itself, cause the income of the
trust to be taxable to him. This is so, irrespective of any right retained or enjoyed
by him as trustee to vote the stock. However, if the stock owned by the trust
is essential to the maintenance of stock control of the corporation, the grantor
will be considered to enjoy an economic advantage thereby and the income of
the trust will be taxable to him. In a recent Tax Court case, the fact that the
stock owned by the trust represented a controlling interest was a factor which
was examined but not considered significant because there was no evidence of
abuse of power by the grantors-trustees.
Thus, the stock held by the trusts was in a corporation of which the grantor
was president and a substantial stockholder. On appeal, the Supreme Court
suggested that the control of the stock of the company of which the grantors
were executives may have determined the manner of creating the trusts. The
case was remanded to the Tax Court which found (2 TC 1103, 1943) that the
stock owned by the trust was not essential to the maintenance of stock control of
the company. Therefore, the trust income was not taxable to the grantor:
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942). The Tax Court said that if trust
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stock were essential to control of company, an economic benefit would be realized
and the income would be taxable to the grantors: Stuart v.\Commissioner, 2 TC
1103, (1943). To the same effect: Meyers v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op.
(CCH. Dec. 13,941 (M)) May 17, 1944.
Likewise, where the grantor-trustee's voice in the corporate affairs of the
company, whose stock was owned by the trust, was not materially increased
br his influence as custodian of the trust's stock, the income of trust was held
not taxable to grantor: Booth v. Commissioner, 3 TC-No. 80 (April 14, 1944).
In another case, the grantor originally retained voting power of stock given
to the trust. Later, he sold the stock and invested in securities representing no
economic advantage to him by way of corporate control. The trust was irrevocable for his wife and children. TheTax Court held the trust income not taxable
to grantor: Bush v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH. Dec. 13,938 (M))
May 16, 1944.
The income of a trust for minor children was held not taxable to the
grantor where the stock in the trusts was not essential to the maintenance of control of corporation .bygrantor alone or with his wife. His wife, or he with her,
had controf without it. The additional fact that the income could be used for
children's support during minority if grantor was not financially able to support them was not considered important: Cullen v,Commissioner, TC Memo. op.
(CCH Dec. 14,039 (M)) July 15, 1944.
The ownership of the controlling stock of a corporation was transferred
to two trusts by the grantors. They appointed themselves as trustees with power
to vote the stock. The Tax Court held this controlling interest was a factor to
be taken into account as to whether the trust comes within the ambit of Helvering
v. Clifford. But since there was no evidence that either grantors abused their
powers as trustees the income was not taxable to the grantors: Weisman v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH. Dec. 14,050 (M)) July 22, 1944.
IDENTITY OF TRUSTEES AS AFFECTING TAXABILITY OF TRUST
INCOME TO GRANTOR

The earlier 'decisions applying the doctrine of Helvering v. Clifford placed
emphasis upon the identity of the trustee. Was the trustee amenable to the
influence of the grantor by reason of their family or business relationships?
If so, a genuine adversity of interest was presumed not to exist in the trustee
and the control vested in the trustee was deemed to be that of the grantor. Taken
together with the other criteria requisite for invoking the Clifford rule, it supplied
the necessary element for making the trust income taxable to the grantor.
In the recent trend away from the rigors of the Clifford doctrine as extended,
the identity of the trustee does not seem to carry such undue weight as heretofore. The stress is now laid upn whether the grantor, irrespective of whether
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he is trustee alone or together with another, will enjoy any economic benefits
from the trust he created aside from those which flow to him from his fiduciary
capacity as trustee.
Thus, a trustee who was the grantor's lawyer was not considered independent: Commissioner v. Barbour, 122 F (2d) 166 (CCA-2nd, 1941). Similarly, where trustee was the grantor's attorney and financial adviser: Commissioner
v. Lamont, 127 F (2d) 875 (CCA-2nd, 1942). The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reached the same conclusion as to a trustee who was the grantor's close
friend and business associate: Bush v. Commissioner, 133 F (2d) 1005 (CCA2nd, 1943).
A corporate trustee was not regarded as independent and where it was
co-trustee with grantor and his wife, the latter two, in effect, were considered
the trustees: Phipps v. Commissioner, 137 F (2d) 141, (CCA-3rd, 1943); but
the adverse interest of the wife as co-trustee with a bank and as one of the
principal beneficiaries of a revocable trust gave her a substantial adverse interest
and the income was not taxable to the grantor: Phipps v. Commissioner, supra.
On the other hand, a husband gave his wife a substantial amount of stock in
a corporation of which he owned the balance of outstanding shares. Four years
later, the wife created trust with the husband as trustee which allowed her income
for life at discretion of trustee. The husband had no beneficial interest in trust
property. The sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held the husband had no
substantial adverse interest in income which was held taxable to wife as grantor:
Ewald v. Commissioner, 141 F (2d) 750 (CCA-6th, April 3, 1944).
Coupled with other factors, such as that the trust was for the benefit of her
18 year old son and was for a term of 12 years at the end of which the corpus
was to be returned to the settlor, the fact that the settlor and her husband were
named as trustees with power retained by settlor to designate any beneficiary
beside herself, was help to complete the "intimate family group" required to make
the income of the trust taxable to the settlor under the Clifford case: Hyman v.
Commissioner 1 TC 911, affirmed 143 F (2d) 425 (CCA-2nd, June 30, 1944).
However, in another recent case, the decedent created three trusts, each of
which named an adult child as beneficiary and himself as trustee. Upon the
death of the life beneficiary the trust terminated and the corpus was to be distributed to persons other than decedent. He retained no power of revocation
and had no reversionary interest. The Tax Court held the income of trust not
taxable to grantor-decedent: Estate of Benjamin Lowenstein v. Commissioner,
3 TC-No. 144 (July 21, 1944).
The income of a long term irrevocable trust of which the grantor was also
trustee and over which the trustee had broad powers of management was held
not taxable to grantor by the Tax Court: Small v. Commissioner, 3 TC-No. 145
(July 21, 1944).
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The fact that the wife was a co-trustee with her husband and was to receive
one fourth of the income during her life was held to give her a sufficient adverse
interest. The Commissioner's claim that she was a nominal trustee was rejected
by the Tax Court even though she did not actively participate in the management of the trust: Weisman v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH. Dec.
14,050 (M)) July 22, 1944.
A more recent expression by the Tax Court evidencing the new trend was
its decision holding the income of a trust taxable to the grantor who named her
husband and another as trustee but retained the right to remove them as well
as broad administrative powers. The sum total of these powers constituted substantial ownership: Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 4 TC-No. 2 (September 18,
1944).
POWER RETAINED TO REMOVE OR APPOINT SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE

The power retained by a grantor to remove or substitute the trustee of a trust
created by him will not, standing alone, cause the income of the trust to be held
taxable to him. Where, however, this power is held by the grantor in conjunction with such other powers of control over the enjoyment of the trust property
as to make him the virtual owner, it will be a factor to be considered in causing
the trust income to be held taxable to the grantor. The recent Tax Court decisions
seem to minimize the mere power to remove the trustee as a significant element
of- control.
Thus, the power retained by the grantor to remove the trustee and appoint
a substitute did not make income taxable to him even though trust funds were
largely used for loan investments to grantor, his corporation and its customers:
Greenspun v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo. op. (CCH. Dec. 13,876 (M)) April
12, 1944.
Likewise, the income of a trust was held not taxable to the grantor who
transferred interests in his business to his wife individually and as trustee for
his minor children. He retained the right to appoint a successor to his wife if
she should resign or become incapacitated before the termination of the trust.
Apparently, this factor not considered a controlling element: Scherer v. Commissioner, 3 TC 776 (May 10, 1944).
However, the power of the grantor to remove the trustee coupled with other
powers of control over the trust property and its enjoyment was held sufficient
to render the trust income taxable to her: Brown v. Commissioner, 131 F (2d)
(CCA-3rd, 1943), Cert. Den. 318 U. S. 767; Stockstrom v. Commissioner,
4 TC-No. 2 '(September 18, 1944).
Thus, a grantor created trust for term of three years or terminable automatically upon his death or that of his son. The income was payable to his wife
as guardian for their son. The grantor named himself and another as co-trustee
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but the latter could be removed at any time by the joint action of the grantor and
his wife. Income of trust was held taxable to grantor under principle of Clifford
case and section 22 (a): Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552 (1941).
PROHIBITING TRUSTEE TO BENEFIT
PERSONALLY FROM TRUST

EFFECT OF STATg LAW

The limitations and restrictions upon the rights and powers of a fiduciary
under the state law where his duties are to be performed and where the trust
property is located have a significant effect upon the taxability of the trust income
to the grantor-trustee. Where the local law restricts the implied powers of the
trustee, or prohibits the trustee from benefitting personally from the trust property, such delimitations of the trustee's rights will be considered in determining
the incidence of the tax upon the trust income.
Thus, the decedent set up trusts with income payable to his three children
of which he was trustee with full power of management. Together with his
wife and children, he had power to revoke the trusts. The grantor was not entitled to income or corpus and pledged himself to maintain and support his
children from his personal est.te. Under the law of Illinois, of which grantor
was a resident, the use of trust income to relieve him of paternal obligation of
support was prohibited. The seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the income
of trusts not taxable to grantor: Commissioner v. Katz,. 139 F (2d) 107 (CCA7th, 1943).
Similarly, a decedent created irrevocable trusts for each of his three adult
children in which he named himself trustee. On the beneficiary's death, the
trusts terminated and the corpus was to be distributed to others than decedent.
He retained no express power of revocation and had no reversionary interest.
Broad powers of management were vested in him as trustee. Under New York
law, the powers granted to trustee did not constitute implied powers to revoke
the trust or to revest the corpus in the grantor. The income of trust was held not
taxable to grantor: Estate of Lowenstein v. Commissioner, 3 TC-No. 144 (July
21, 1944).
The fact that the grantor-trustee with wide powers of management of an
irrevocable trust for his wife and children could not, under the state law (Iowa),
act for his personal benefit or do anything which would place him in a position
inconsistent with the best interests of the beneficiaries, may be considered in applying the Clifford rule: Cberry v. Commissioners, 3 TC-No. 149 (July 31, 1944).
Where the decree of a state court forclosed any possibility that the trust income,
.intended for the benefit of settlor's children, would be devoted* to discharge of
settlor's obligation of parental support, the trust income was not taxable to settlor:
Buhl v. Commissioner, TC Memo. op. (CCH Dec. 14,262 (M)), November
28, 1944.
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CONCLUSION

While the present tax status of the income of trusts is by no means settled,
there are certain definite principles established by the decisions of the Courts
which serve as reliable guides. The past year has seen several significant changes
in the decisional law and one by legislative enactment, pressaging a trend in favor
of the grantor. It is safe to assume that new interpretations and shifting
emphasis will be forthcoming in future decisions. Considering the number of
possible refinements in the trust mechanism, it is injudicious to frame an allinclusive, binding rule. Legal ingenuity has all too frequently demonstrated its
capacity for creating new machinery to avoid the consequences of what was intended to be an all-embracing precept.
In our discussion we observed certain principles develop. While their application may vary with the peculiar facts of a given case, it should serve a useful
purpose to briefly summarize them:
1. Trusts for the benefit of members bearing towards each other an intimate family relationship will be closely scrutinized. Their income will be held
taxable to the grantor who retains in substance the full enjoyment of all rights
he previously had in the property. The length of the term of the trust is not
controlling.
2. The retention by the grantor of the power to manage the trust property
or to supervise the investment of the corpus does not, of itself, cause the grantor
to be taxed on the income of the trust if he cannot derive any economic benefit
therefrom other than that which will accrue to him in his fiduciary capacity.
3. Where a grantor retains power to control the distribution of income
or corpus, or to change the beneficiaries or to alter their respective shares, the
income will be taxable to the grantor. The term of the trust, whether long or
short, is not determinative. Nor is it controlling that the power so retained
may not be exercised in his own favor.
4. The mere fact that the corpus of
ventures of the grantor, or that the corpus
controlled by the grantor, will not make the
unless, in the latter instance, the trust shares
corporate control.

the trust may be used in business
consists of shares in a corporation
income of the trust taxable to him
are essential to the maintenance of

5. The fact that the grantor is the trustee, or that the grantor retains
power to remove the trustee and appoint another, standing alone, is not sufficient to result in the grantor being taxed on the income from the trust.
6. Where the grantor retains the power to recapture the corpus either by
his own action or by that of any person not having a substantial adverse interest,
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the income of the trust will be taxable to him. However, if the power to revest
the corpus is exercisable only upon the payment by the grantor of a fair consideration for the trust property, a contrary result will be reached.
7. If the grantor of a trust receives the benefit of the income therefrom
because it may be used to support a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally
obligated to maintain, the income of the trust will be taxable to the grantor
but only to the extent that the income actually is used for the support and
maintenance of the beneficiary.
The above principles are, of course, subject to the usual limitations attendant
upon any broad statement. While they may be absolute in expression, their application frequently presents considerable difficulty since factual situations do
not exist in a theoretical vacuum such as we create for purposes of rule-making.
Although in a given case any one factor would not of itself be controlling to
cause trust income to be taxable to the. grantor, the presence of several such
factors may produce a contrary result. Each case must depend upon its own
individual facts but the foregoing principles should furnish a reliable measuring
rod in analyzing trust problems.
*The author acknowledges the assistance in research of Barton E. Ferst, Esq., of the Philadelphia Bar.

